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Abstract 
 
In recent years there have been marked changes in organisational structures and budgetary 
arrangements in the English NHS, potentially altering the relationships between purchasers 
(primary care organisations (PCOs) and general practices) and providers.  Using data on 
elective hospital admissions from 1997/98 to 2002/03 we find that commissioning has 
become significantly more concentrated at PCO and GP level. There was a reduction in the 
average number of different providers used by PCOs (16.7 to 14.2), an increase in the 
average share of admissions accounted for by the main provider (49% to 69%), and an 
increase in the average Herfindahl index (0.35 to 0.55).  About half the increase in 
concentration arose from the increase in the number of purchasing organisations from 100 to 
302.  The rest was due to mergers amongst providers and the abolition of fundholding. GP 
fundholding practices which held budgets for elective admissions had less concentrated 
admission patterns than non-fundholders whose admissions were paid for by their primary 
care organisation.  There was an increase in concentration of admissions for both types of GP 
practice but fundholders used more providers, had smaller shares at their main provider, and 
had smaller Herfindahl indices. 
 
Keywords:  concentration, Herfindahl, purchasing, budgets, elective admissions 
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Introduction 
 
Health care delivery is characterised by a substantial degree of geographical monopoly. Research in 
the UK and elsewhere has focused on measuring market concentration and the scope for competition 
amongst providers [1-4].  However, even where the potential for competition exists, the role of the 
purchaser is vital because unless they use their leverage, there will be little incentive for providers to 
respond.   
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which English NHS purchasers of elective hospital 
care concentrate their admissions amongst providers and the extent to which they switch their 
business amongst them.  In recent years there have been major changes in organisational and 
budgetary arrangements and there has been a trend to mergers amongst providers.  By examining 
elective hospital admission data from 1997/98 to 2002/03, we explore whether these factors have had 
any impact on measures of the concentration of use of providers and commissioners’ willingness to 
switch amongst providers.  We also compare trends in the commissioning measure for fundholding 
general practice which held a budget for elective admissions and for non-fundholding practices whose 
patients’ admissions were paid for by their local health authority.  The analysis identifies the impact of 
alternative purchasing arrangements and provides a baseline for analysing the impact of more recent 
policy developments, including the recent reintroduction of practice level budgets, which are intended 
to alter commissioning patterns. 
 
 
Purchaser/provider relationships in the NHS 
 
Internal market 
 
In the UK National Health Service (NHS) almost all care is provided free at the point of use. NHS 
patients register with gate-keeping general practitioners (GPs) who are the only route by which NHS 
patients can access elective (non-emergency) secondary care.  
 
In 1991 a Conservative government introduced the NHS internal market.  Purchasers and providers of 
secondary health care were split. NHS hospitals were removed from the direct control of Health 
Authorities (HAs). HAs became purchasers of health care, constrained by a budget determined by a 
needs weighted capitation formula. NHS hospitals remained within the public sector but were required 
to compete for contracts from purchasers. As part of the 1991 reforms, larger general practices could 
volunteer to become fundholders [5].  Fundholding practices were given annual budgets by their 
Health Authority to purchase elective hospital procedures.  Non-fundholding practices continued to 
have all health care expenditure on their patients covered by their HA from its budget.  By the time 
fundholding was abolished by the new Labour government in April 1999, around 50% of practices had 
elected to join the fundholding scheme.   
 
In the early days of the internal market considerable policy emphasis was placed on shifting the 
balance of power away from providers towards purchasers (HAs and GP fundholders).  Purchasing 
was seen as the “engine driving the reforms”, the contracting process was a means of encouraging 
provider competition and responsiveness, and purchasers were told: “ if a provider does not deliver 
satisfactory value for money …. consider moving your health care business elsewhere” [6]. 
Purchasers were expected to move away from services based on historical configurations to patterns 
better reflecting the needs of their populations.  The evidence suggests that patterns of contracting 
remained largely unchanged, aside from small shifts of marginal activity in areas where some choice 
of provider existed [2,7-9].  There were concerns about how much leverage purchasers could have 
when faced with powerful providers defending historical patterns of service provision [10].  Mergers 
amongst hospitals also created larger providers with powerful vested interests of clinicians who could 
be unresponsive to demands of purchasers.   
 
The pattern of utilisation of hospitals for patients was determined by GPs and patients and by the 
commissioning arrangements with providers made by HAs.  The contracts HAs made with providers 
were most often block contracts under which the amount the HA paid to the provider did not vary with 
the number of patients treated. GPs have always been able to refer patients to any provider subject 
only to the provider’s willingness to accept them. Fundholding GPs had a greater incentive to “shop 
around”.  First, they could make budget savings by finding providers with lower prices whereas any 
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savings achieved by non-fundholders accrued to the HA, not the practice.  Second, although all 
practices could search for providers with better quality, fundholders could also hope to extract better 
quality terms since they paid a price per admission and so could reduce provider revenue by taking 
their business elsewhere.  Non-fundholders had no such threat because of the block contract 
between the HA and the provider.  
 
After the introduction of the internal market, GP choice of provider continued to be influenced by 
personal knowledge of providers, professional experience and the desire to retain historical 
relationships [11,12].  Early studies of referral patterns reported limited signs of GPs making 
substantial shifts or switching referrals to out of area providers [13-15]. 
 
There is some evidence to suggest that fundholders were more active purchasers in search of lower 
prices and better quality [3,5,16] that providers were more responsive to fundholders than to HAs [17].  
For example, patients of fundholders had shorter waiting times for elective procedures than patients 
of non-fundholding practices [18-20].  Other studies have suggested that inertia and a reluctance to 
move away from historical patterns left the overall situation largely unchanged, especially in some 
specialist services [21-26].    
 
New Labour 
 
With the election of the Labour government in May 1997 policy rhetoric shifted away from a focus on 
purchasing, contracts, markets and competition towards commissioning, long term agreements, and 
collaboration.  Commissioning was intended to be strategic and based on the patient experience, 
rather than on the purchase of individual elements of the service.  
 
Fundholding was abolished in April 1999 (by which time around 50% of the population were in 
fundholding practices).  Budgets for purchasing health care were removed from HAs and devolved to 
smaller, newly created, Primary Care Groups (PCGs), later replaced by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
which have populations of around 180,000, compared with HAs which had average populations of 
around 550,000. HAs’ other functions were shifted to these new primary care organisations and HAs 
were abolished in April 2003. 
 
The development of PCGs and PCTs shifted responsibility for commissioning firmly to primary care 
and PCTs now spend over 80% of the healthcare budget.  Whilst the emphasis was on developing 
long-term co-operative relationships with providers, PCOs were encouraged to “look at new models 
for service delivery rather than committing resources on a historical basis to traditional providers 
through block agreements” [27].  However, less than a quarter of PCOs felt they had effective 
leverage over providers of hospital care, with smaller PCOs believing they had less leverage than 
larger ones [28].  There appeared to be very limited switching of contracts in the early days of primary 
care based commissioning, even where choice of provider existed [28,29].   
 
Recent policy initiatives 
 
Recent policy initiatives have been intended to strengthen the role of Primary Care Organisations 
(PCOs) as purchasers of health care services.  First, a prospective payment regime (payment by 
results (PBR)) using fixed national tariffs has been introduced, so that payments to providers follow 
the patients they treat [30].  Second, by April 2006 patients must be offered a choice of provider or 
their first out-patient appointment at the time of referral by their GP [31].  The expectation is that 
providers who are more responsive to patients and GPs will gain income, and those who are not will 
lose income and eventually fail.  Third, diversity in the supply of health care has been encouraged by 
allowing entry of private and public providers, including new independent diagnostic and treatment 
centres.  Fourth, from April 2005, a variant of fundholding has been reintroduced, with practices able 
to opt to hold budgets for secondary care [32].  The hope is that it will enable budget holding GPs the 
power to contract on behalf of their patients for a wider choice of services in a variety of different 
settings [33]. 
 
Research questions 
 
Studies of the effects of these policy changes on commissioning have usually been small scale and 
qualitative and little is known about trends in commissioning patterns.  In this paper we examine the 
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extent to which purchasers concentrate their patients’ use of secondary care amongst hospitals, 
whether patterns of concentration have been stable over time, and whether purchasers switch 
providers.  By comparing the trends in the concentration of hospital use of patients in fundholding and 
non-fundholding practices we also aim to establish whether changes in budgetary arrangements have 
the power to change longstanding commissioning patterns.  In particular we investigate whether 
fundholding practices were more “active” commissioners in that they had a less concentrated use of 
providers and were more likely to switch providers.  We use a data set of all elective admissions over 
the period from 1997/98 to 2002/03 which covers the ending of the internal market, the abolition of 
fundholding, and the introduction of primary care led commissioning.  We can thereby examine 
whether these major changes in organisational and budgetary arrangements had any impact on 
commissioning patterns and also provide a baseline against which the effects of the most recent sets 
of policy initiatives can be assessed.  
 
 
Data and methods 
 
Data sources 
 
Data were collated from three main sources: Hospital Episodes Statistics (HES) for admissions, 
General Medical Statistics (GMS) for practice characteristics and the database assembled for the 
AREA project [34] for socio-economic characteristics and provider characteristics.  Data sources are 
described more fully in Dusheiko et al [20].  Table 1 gives summary statistics for the variables 
included in the final models. 
 
We use the admissions for elective hospital care to construct measures describing commissioning 
patterns.  Gatekeeping general practices have always had discretion in their choice of provider, even 
when the budget for secondary care was held by the higher level commissioning organisations to 
which they belong.  Thus it is of interest to construct measures of commissioning patterns at both 
practice level and at the more aggregated level of the organisations (HAs and PCTs) which held 
budgets and had formal responsibility for commissioning.  Measures only at the practice or the higher 
level could give a misleading account of changes.  For example, a PCT with 10 practices whose 
admissions were evenly spread over 10 providers would have the same PCT level of concentration of 
commissioning as a PCT with 10 equal sized practices each of which used a single different provider.  
Conversely, practice level concentration measures would be the same if each of the 10 practices all 
used the same provider or if they each used a single different provider but the PCT level measures 
would differ.   
 
Finished Consultant Episodes (FCE)s for elective (non-emergency) admissions to English hospitals 
were obtained from HES for the six-year period 1997/98 to 2002/03.  Each FCE was linked to the 
patient’s general practice and to the NHS Trust (provider) where treatment took place.  Only FCEs for 
patients in practices which were in existence over the entire period were included. GP practices which 
ceased to exist during the panel were dropped and new practices were not added. 
 
To assess the trends in patterns of admissions to provider Trusts from higher level commissioning 
units over time we required units with stable geographies that were also relevant for commissioning.  
During the period for which we have data there were major changes in administrative structure and 
geographies. In 1997/98 the basic higher level units for commissioning were 100 HAs which had 
average populations of around 550,000.  In 2002/03 the basic organisational units were 302 PCTs 
which had average populations of around 180,000.  Since our measures of commissioning patterns 
are affected by the size of the market (the population for whom care is purchased) we constructed 
time series of commissioning measures based on frozen populations for HAs and PCTs. 
 
To create the frozen HA level commissioning variables we aggregated elective admissions for 
practices within the HAs they belonged to in 1997/98.  Then commissioning measures were 
constructed for the frozen HAs for each year from 1997/98 to 2002/03 by using the admissions from 
the practices they contained in 1997/98.  Similarly we created frozen PCT level commissioning 
measures by aggregating elective admissions within the PCTs to which the practices belonged in 
2002/03. Since we are primarily concerned with the trends in the commissioning variables over the 
period, using populations with reasonably stable sizes ensures that any changes are due to real 
changes in the way admissions of a given population are concentrated amongst providers, rather than  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for GP practice level variables 
Variable Definition Data Source Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
NumProv99 Number of providers used by GP practice which accounts 
for 99% of admissions 
HES 56388 7.738 4.394 0 28 
MainShare Share of elective admissions at main provider HES 55194 0.711 0.173 0.111 1 
Herfindahl Herfindahl concentration index HES 55194 0.573 0.201 0.084 1 
AddShare Share of admissions at providers added between years  42919 0.060 0.169 0.0005 1 
DropShare Share of admissions at providers dropped between years HES 43487 0.125 0.258 0.0005 1 
fundholder Standard GP fundholder PPA  58284 0.377 0.485 0 1 
praclist Total practice listsize 3-yr moving average GMS statistics (1998) 45843 5874.837 3671.490 1001.5 34218.33 
listpergp List size per wte GP 3-yr moving average GMS statistics (1998) 45843 2064.812 507.424 541.6 9347 
gpcontracept Proportion GPs providing contraceptive services GMS statistics (1998) 45223 0.129 0.258 0 1 
gpsingle Practice is single handed GMS statistics (1998) 45234 0.266 0.442 0 1 
mmr2prac Proportion of GPs doing MMR2 GMS statistics (1998) 45237 0.314 0.345 0 1 
gpdeput Proportion of GPs permitted to use deputy GMS statistics (1998) 45248 0.762 0.396 0 1 
dispensingprac Practice has dispensing status GMS statistics (1998) 45107 0.149 0.356 0 1 
distacute Average distance from GP practice to 5 nearest providers   OCS/AREA project 52271 24.742 10.844 11.757 109.095 
distprivate Mean distance to nearest 5 private hospitals  OCS/AREA project 52271 22.719 9.860 10.458 98.989 
acutebeds Average beds at 5 nearest acute providers OCS/AREA project 52271 505.031 134.402 173.789 997.256 
privatebeds Accessibility to private beds OCS/AREA project 52271 39.308 16.163 8.406 124.781 
residential Residential places per person over 75 DoH/AREA project 52271 0.008 0.007 0 0.168 
cmf0-74 Comparative mortality factor under age 75 ONS/AREA project 52271 105.071 23.127 55.404 213.648 
lowbirthwght Percentage of low birthweight babies ID/AREA project 52271 7.539 1.477 2.421 12.973 
disability Proportion of population with attendance 
allowance/Disability living allowance claims 
ID/AREA project 52271 5.434 2.065 1.237 16.614 
incapacity Incapacity/Severe disability allowance claimants AREA project 52271 101.437 52.659 13.772 434.157 
educdepriv DETR index of education deprivation (ward level attributed 
to practices) 
ID/AREA project 52271 0.269 0.757 -2.285 2.792 
notuniv Percentage of the population aged 17 not going to 
University 
ID/AREA project 52271 85.148 6.641 44.814 98.327 
jobseekers Proportion eligible population claiming job seekers 
allowance  
AREA project 52271 4.977 3.356 0.265 20.55 
unemployment Unemployment rate 1991 census/AREA project 52271 0.102 0.050 0.017 0.394 
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to changes in the size of the populations.  The levels of commissioning variables in 2002/03 
calculated for the frozen 2002/03 PCT population based series provide an accurate measure of the 
commissioning variables for the populations covered by the main commissioning organisations 
(PCTs) in that year.  Similarly the levels of the variables for 1997/98 from the 1997/98 frozen HA 
series is an accurate measure of the commissioning variables for the populations covered by the main 
commissioning organisation (HAs) in that year.   
 
We also calculated the same commissioning measures at practice level for our panel of GP practices.  
The measures will be affected by the number of patients in the practice but few of our practices had 
major changes in population over the period.  When we analyse practice commissioning measures we 
also allow for the effect of practice list size.   
 
Practice-level variables were constructed to control for factors influencing the concentration of 
hospital use by each GP practice in the analysis of fundholding effects.  These included practice-level 
mean waiting time data derived from HES. Data on practice populations were taken from the PCT 
database at the National Primary Care Research and Development Centre (NPCRDC).  Demographic 
effects were allowed for by including the age and sex proportions of the practice population as 
explanatory variables in the models.  We coded practices as fundholding only if they were standard 
fundholders (holding a budget for elective admissions).  Community fundholders who had a budget for 
district nursing, health visiting and other services provided outside hospital were classified as non-
fundholders.  We had data on practice characteristics, based on the Department of Health’s General 
Medical Statistics, from the NPCRDC website.  We also had information on the socio-economic 
characteristics of the practice populations for 1999 and data on supply factors including distance from 
practice populations to NHS Trusts (providers), private hospitals, residential and nursing homes, 
numbers of beds and consultants at NHS Trusts.  
 
Commissioning measures  
 
We constructed five measures for each of the three types of commissioning unit (frozen 1997/98 HAs, 
frozen 2002/03 PCTs, GP practices) to describe the patterns of use of providers for elective 
admissions. 
 
NumProv99it: the number of providers used by patients in population i in period t which accounts for 
99% of admissions.  For each provider j used by population i in year t we count the elective 
admissions xijt from population i to the provider, calculate the share /ijt iktkx x∑ , rank the providers 
in decreasing order by share, and construct the cumulative relative frequency. We truncate the 
measure at the 99th centile since the total number of providers used was sensitive to use of providers 
with a very small number of admissions from population i.  
 
MainShareit: the share of admissions for population i at the provider which had most elective 
admissions from the population in year t: max   / kj ijt iktx x∑ .  The MainShare variable gives an 
indication of how important the largest provider is for the i’th population.   
 
Herfindahlit: the Herfindahl index for population i in period t is 
2( )ijt ikt
j k
x x∑ ∑ . The Herfindahl is the 
standard measure of overall market concentration and has the advantage that it is based on 
admissions to all the providers used. The reciprocal of the Herfindahl is the number of equal sized 
firms which would produce the same degree of concentration and is a useful alternative measure of 
concentration.   
 
The number of providers, the share of the largest provider, and the Herfindahl measure concentration 
of use but do not provide any information about the volatility of market shares since they do not 
depend on the identity of providers in any given year. A population could have the same Herfindahl in 
two years with the same set of providers or with an entirely new set. We are interested in how much 
switching of providers takes place. Hence we constructed two measures based on changes in the 
identity of providers used by populations. However the identity of providers used may change 
because of mergers, with no change in actual patterns of use of hospitals. Hence we need to remove 
the effect of mergers from our switching measures.  
6    CHE Research paper 11 
 
We list the providers used by patients in unit i in year t and in year t+1.  We delete all providers who 
were new in year t+1 because they had been produced by mergers in the previous year.  We also 
delete all providers who were used in year t but not in year t+1 who had been involved in mergers in 
year t.  We then use the purged list of providers for population i to calculate two measures of 
switching:  
 
AddShareit+1 = 
1 1
1 1/
it it
ikt ijtk N j P
x x
+ ++ +∈ ∈∑ ∑  is the share of elective admissions for population i in year 
t+1 at providers who were new in year t+1. Nit+1 is the set of new providers t+1 in the purged list and 
Pit+1 is the set of all providers used by patients in unit i in year t+1.    
 
DropShareit+1 = 
1 1
1/
it it
ikt ijtk D j P
x x
+ + +∈ ∈∑ ∑  is the ratio of the sum of elective admissions for population 
i in year t at providers who were used in year t but not in t+1 to the total admissions for population i in 
year t. Dit+1 is the set of providers on the purged list who were used by population i in year t but not in 
year t+1. 
    
Notice that there is no reason why the two switching measures should be equal since for example a 
commissioner might drop one large provider and increase use at all other existing providers without 
using any new providers.    
 
The first three concentration variables are calculated for all six years and the two switching measures 
for the change between each of two adjacent years in the six year panel (giving five years).   
 
Regression models 
 
The trends in concentration and switching at frozen HA or frozen PCT level indicate whether the 
major changes in organisational and financial structure had an effect on commissioning patterns.  But 
they do not enable us to determine which was responsible for any trend we observe since they were 
introduced simultaneously.  However, there was one significant change in budgetary arrangement 
which might have been expected to affect admission patterns and which affected populations 
differentially: the abolition of fundholding in 1999/00.  We therefore compare the changes in the 
commissioning measures for fundholding and non-fundholding practices over the period to identify the 
effect on the commissioning behaviour of fundholding practices with the abolition of fundholding.  We 
can thereby test whether changes in budgetary arrangements affect commissioning patterns. 
 
We estimated difference in difference regression models of practice level commissioning measures.  
To increase the precision of the tests for an effect of the abolition of fundholding on fundholders we 
include a wide range of practice level covariates, some of whose effects are also of interest in their 
own right.  We selected the covariates after examining variance inflation factors for signs of multi-
collinearity and dropping highly collinear variables [35].  We used STATA Version 8 to estimate a 
variety of panel data models: pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed effects, random effects and 
generalised estimation equation (GEE) models [36].  The estimated effects of the fundholding regime 
were qualitatively insensitive to the estimation method. We report only the results from the GEE 
models which provide estimates of the effects of time invariant covariates but without the need to 
assume that these are uncorrelated with unobserved practice effects.  Robust standard errors were 
employed throughout.  
 
We include Health Authority dummy variables in all models to allow for unobserved effects from socio-
economic factors, higher level purchasing policies, and variations in provider supply conditions.  The 
results were not greatly affected by the use of these dummies.  We dropped practices whose 3-year 
moving average practice population size was ever less than 1000.  Since waiting times may be 
affected by the choice of provider but may also in turn affect the number of admissions and hence 
possibly our commissioning variables, we ran models with and without the mean practice-level waiting 
time.  The waiting variable made little difference to the results and we report results for the reduced 
form models without waiting times.   
 
Since the five practice level commissioning variables are jointly determined by practice decisions we 
also estimated seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) models with the three concentration measures 
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(number of providers used, Herfindahl index, share of admissions at main provider).  Similarly, we ran 
SUR models for the measures of switching.  The correlation matrices of the residuals from the two 
SUR models showed correlations in the errors between share at main provider and Herfindahl, but not 
the number of providers used.  The DID estimates of the effect of fundholding for the SUR models 
were similar to those from the separate regressions and so we do not report the SUR results. 
 
We chose the functional forms for the equations by inspecting the distributions of the dependent 
variables, using Box-Cox transformations of the dependent variable, and applying PE tests of the 
linear versus log linear models [37]. The distributions of the five variables are shown in Figure 1. The 
three concentration measures were estimated in levels. The two switching measures were right 
skewed and were transformed into logs for running the regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of commissioning measures for GP practices, all electives, all years 
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Results 
 
Higher level commissioning trends 
 
Table 2 reports the five commissioning measures for frozen 1997/98 HA and frozen 2002/03 PCT 
populations from 1997/98 to 2002/03.  We focus on the frozen PCT measures since these are the 
current set of purchasing organisations and the trends in the measures are the same for frozen PCTs 
and frozen HAs.  In 2002/3 the average number of providers used by the 302 PCTs was 14.2 (CI: 
13.5, 14.9).  All confidence intervals are 95% and based on the unweighted distributions.  The 
distribution of shares of admissions across providers was highly skewed.  The main provider 
accounted, on average, for 69% (CI: 0.67, 0.71) of a PCT’s admissions and the Herfinhdahl was 0.55 
(CI: 0.52, 0.57), equivalent to 1.8 equal size providers. PCT commissioning appears to be highly 
concentrated.  Comparison with the frozen HA measures for 2002/03 shows the effect of the change 
in size of commissioning unit due to the replacement of 100 HAs with 302 PCTs.  The increase in the 
number of providers used who account for 99% of admissions from using frozen HAs rather than 
actual PCTs in 2002/03 is relatively small (15.8 versus 14.2) whereas the proportionate effect on the 
share at main provider (57.4% versus 69.4%) and the Herfindahl (0.43 versus 0.55) is somewhat 
greater. 
 
 
Table 2: Higher level commissioning trends 1997/8 – 2002/3 
  Frozen 1997/8 Health Authorities 
(n = 100) 
Frozen 2002/3 Primary Care Trusts (n = 
302) 
 Year Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
NumProv99 97/98 16.700 7.027 4 35 14.914 7.188 3 39 
 98/99 15.420 6.634 3 30 13.864 7.103 1 46 
 99/00 15.360 6.544 3 35 13.897 6.545 2 41 
 00/01 15.360 6.185 3 31 13.798 6.240 2 36 
 01/02 15.300 6.191 3 29 13.639 5.947 2 27 
 02/03 15.820 6.590 3 32 14.156 6.228 2 31 
MainShare 97/98 0.494 0.175 0.242 0.918 0.629 0.180 0.193 0.967 
 98/99 0.508 0.180 0.242 0.919 0.650 0.182 0.223 0.982 
 99/00 0.516 0.189 0.216 0.920 0.661 0.175 0.205 0.946 
 00/01 0.527 0.183 0.218 0.911 0.672 0.172 0.188 0.970 
 01/02 0.553 0.190 0.267 0.904 0.681 0.173 0.273 0.971 
 02/03 0.574 0.192 0.253 0.901 0.694 0.168 0.295 0.968 
Herfindahl 97/98 0.354 0.168 0.143 0.845 0.475 0.193 0.111 0.935 
 98/99 0.369 0.175 0.136 0.847 0.501 0.197 0.132 0.965 
 99/00 0.378 0.184 0.119 0.848 0.510 0.190 0.122 0.896 
 00/01 0.387 0.176 0.122 0.831 0.522 0.187 0.119 0.941 
 01/02 0.409 0.186 0.171 0.818 0.533 0.190 0.168 0.944 
 02/03 0.428 0.189 0.164 0.817 0.546 0.188 0.180 0.937 
AddShare  98/99 0.0355 0.1085 0.0004 0.6467 0.0416 0.1400 0.0002 0.8908 
 99/00 0.0275 0.0808 0.0005 0.6243 0.0407 0.1379 0.0005 0.9232 
 00/01 0.0093 0.0423 0.0002 0.3416 0.0097 0.0461 0.0003 0.6749 
 01/02 0.0288 0.1165 0.0003 0.8412 0.0306 0.1227 0.0004 0.9526 
 02/03 0.0088 0.0130 0.0004 0.0620 0.0099 0.0201 0.0005 0.2022 
DropShare  98/99 0.0881 0.2174 0.0007 0.9812 0.0982 0.2251 0.0006 0.9537 
 99/00 0.0680 0.1558 0.0006 0.9070 0.0690 0.1737 0.0003 0.9519 
 00/01 0.0334 0.1293 0.0003 0.7776 0.0340 0.1350 0.0004 0.8460 
 01/02 0.1092 0.2306 0.0007 0.9191 0.0968 0.2250 0.0008 0.9540 
 02/03 0.0929 0.2146 0.0003 0.9132 0.1042 0.2475 0.0004 0.9824 
 
 
Moreover commissioning appears to have become more concentrated between 1997/98 and 2002/03.  
There was a decrease of 9% in the average number of providers used from 14.9 (CI: 14.1, 15.7) to 
13.6 (CI:13.0, 14.3) in 2001/02, although the decrease was not statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level.  There was a noticeable increase in the final year to 14.2 providers (CI: 13.5, 14.9).     
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The share of admissions at the main provider increased significantly between 1997/98 and 2002/03 
from 0.63 (CI: 0.61, 0.65 ) to 0.69 (CI: 0.67, 0.71).  The Herfindahl index also increased significantly 
from 0.48 (CI: 0.45, 0.50) to 0.55 (CI: 0.52, 0.57) over the same time period.  
 
There was no systematic overall trend in the share of admissions at new providers or dropped from 
existing providers.  In 1998/99 and 1999/00 new providers had just over 4% of admissions but this fell 
to 1% in 2000/01, then rose to 3% and finally fell back to 1% in 2002/03.  The share of admissions at 
providers who were dropped fell from 10% in 1998/99 to 7% in 1999/00 to 3.4% in 2000/01 and then 
rose to 10% in 2001/02 and 2002/3.  The share of admissions dropped at providers is much greater 
than the share at new providers which is consistent with the increasing trend in concentration and 
suggests purchasers tend to shift patients from dropped providers to existing providers, rather than to 
new providers.  
 
Practice level commissioning trends 
 
Table 3 shows trends in the GP practice level Herfindahl index.  Commissioning is highly 
concentrated at practice level: in 2002/03 for all elective admissions the average Herfindahl was 0.60, 
7.93 providers accounted for 99% of admissions, and the main provider accounted for 73.3% of 
admissions.  As with the frozen HA and PCT higher level populations shown in Table 2, hospital 
admissions have also become more concentrated at practice level.  The mean practice Herfindahl for 
all elective admissions increased from 0.54 to 0.60 between 1997/98 and 2002/03.   
 
Payment by results (PBR) was introduced for 15 elective Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) in 
April 2004, as the first step in a roll-out, covering treatments with either waiting time or other policy 
priorities.  Table 3 shows the average practice level Herfindahls for these HRGs.  The mean 
Herfindahl for the 15 HRGs in 2002/03 was 0.65. The 15 HRGs account for 13.7% of total elective 
admissions so that although the mean Herfindahl for the 15 PBR HRGs is larger than for all 535 
elective HRGs, the increase is quite small.  Table 3 also shows the mean practice Herfindahl for one 
of the PBR HRGs (BO2 - phakoemulsification cataract extraction with lens implant) which accounts for 
1.7% of elective admission.  The Herfindahl is extremely high (0.85) and this is reflected in the fact on 
average only 1.42 providers account for 99% of a practice’s BO2 cataract admissions.  
 
 
Table 3: Practice level commissioning trends 1997/8 – 2002/3: Herfindahl indices 
 General practices 
 n Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
All elective HRGs      
1997/98 9225 0.541 0.198 0.090 1 
1998/99 9297 0.562 0.204 0.084 1 
1999/00 9318 0.569 0.203 0.089 1 
2000/01 9343 0.581 0.199 0.092 1 
2001/02 9376 0.590 0.201 0.122 1 
2002/03 9397 0.600 0.200 0.089 1 
15 Initial payment by results HRGs  
1997/98 8855 0.600 0.225 0.128 1 
1998/99 8757 0.618 0.227 0.136 1 
1999/00 8649 0.630 0.222 0.156 1 
2000/01 8601 0.637 0.219 0.134 1 
2001/02 8921 0.653 0.220 0.160 1 
2002/03 8527 0.652 0.217 0.146 1 
Cataract extractions (BO2)   
1997/98 8128 0.851 0.207 0.222 1 
1998/99 8611 0.848 0.202 0.220 1 
1999/00 8772 0.849 0.198 0.208 1 
2000/01 8810 0.845 0.196 0.210 1 
2001/02 8859 0.852 0.192 0.236 1 
2002/03 8835 0.851 0.192 0.228 1 
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Budgets and practice level commissioning patterns 
 
The reintroduction of fundholding under the label of practice based commissioning makes it of interest 
to look in some detail at the effect of fundholding on commissioning patterns.  Table 4 shows the five 
commissioning measures for fundholding and non-fundholding practices for the last two years of 
fundholding (1997/98 and 1998/99) and the first four years post-fundholding.   
 
 
Table 4: Commissioning trends for fundholder and non-fundholder practices 
 
  Fundholding GP practices Non-fundholding GP practices 
 Year n Mean SD Min Max n Mean SD Min Max 
NumProv99 97/98 3658 9.010 4.351 0 28 5960 6.716 4.231 0 25 
 98/99 3655 8.832 4.371 0 25 5913 6.779 4.298 0 26 
 99/00 3652 8.879 4.341 0 25 5886 6.876 4.253 0 22 
 00/01 3645 8.931 4.352 0 26 5873 6.933 4.239 0 26 
 01/02 3648 8.845 4.330 0 25 5836 6.912 4.115 0 24 
 02/03 3640 9.130 4.520 0 24 5807 7.171 4.270 0 24 
MainShare 97/98 3653 0.675 0.171 0.162 1 5572 0.690 0.179 0.159 1 
 98/99 3658 0.695 0.173 0.125 1 5639 0.705 0.180 0.164 1 
 99/00 3655 0.703 0.167 0.172 1 5663 0.710 0.179 0.143 1 
 00/01 3650 0.717 0.161 0.128 1 5693 0.719 0.175 0.167 1 
 01/02 3643 0.722 0.162 0.167 1 5733 0.727 0.175 0.194 1 
 02/03 3638 0.733 0.158 0.111 1 5759 0.733 0.174 0.172 1 
Herfindahl 97/98 3653 0.526 0.191 0.090 1 5572 0.552 0.202 0.097 1 
 98/99 3658 0.550 0.197 0.084 1 5639 0.570 0.209 0.102 1 
 99/00 3655 0.559 0.192 0.089 1 5663 0.576 0.209 0.103 1 
 00/01 3650 0.573 0.189 0.092 1 5693 0.586 0.206 0.108 1 
 01/02 3643 0.580 0.189 0.141 1 5733 0.597 0.207 0.122 1 
 02/03 3638 0.593 0.187 0.089 1 5759 0.605 0.207 0.115 1 
AddShare  98/99 3514 0.0530 0.1401 0.0005 1 5057 0.0871 0.2047 0.0006 1 
 99/00 3515 0.0468 0.1327 0.0006 1 5096 0.0826 0.2089 0.0007 1 
 00/01 3487 0.0273 0.0861 0.0006 1 5040 0.0591 0.1740 0.0006 1 
 01/02 3469 0.0429 0.1312 0.0005 1 5081 0.0751 0.2042 0.0005 1 
 02/03 3521 0.0283 0.0719 0.0005 1 5139 0.0669 0.1859 0.0006 1 
DropShare  98/99 3525 0.1128 0.2327 0.0006 1 5106 0.1326 0.2626 0.0005 1 
 99/00 3545 0.1059 0.2234 0.0006 1 5124 0.1375 0.2650 0.0005 1 
 00/01 3535 0.0972 0.2312 0.0006 1 5081 0.1014 0.2430 0.0006 1 
 01/02 3560 0.1172 0.2426 0.0006 1 5222 0.1496 0.2796 0.0007 1 
 02/03 3552 0.1213 0.2594 0.0005 1 5237 0.1535 0.2974 0.0007 1 
All elective admissions 
 
 
Table 5 has the estimates of the effects of fundholding on commissioning from the panel data models.  
The coefficients on the variables Diff in diff 1998/99 - 2002/03 indicate the difference in difference 
estimates of the effect of the fundholding scheme in each of these years compared to the baseline 
year 1997/98.  Table 6 reports the estimates of the difference between fundholder and non-fundholder 
practice commissioning over time holding all other factors in the regressions in Table 5 constant and 
Figure 2 plots these changes.  
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Table 5: GP commissioning patterns: all elective admissions 
 NumProv99 MainShare Herfindahl ln(AddShare) ln(DropShare) 
1998/99 0.0165 0.0138 0.0161   
 [0.45] [7.98]** [8.24]**   
1999/00 0.0995 0.0177 0.0205 -0.0521 -0.1575 
 [2.39]* [8.13]** [8.40]** [2.24]* [4.75]** 
2000/01 0.1526 0.0250 0.0279 -0.3567 -0.6259 
 [3.51]** [10.56]** [10.50]** [13.94]** [19.49]** 
2001/02 0.1184 0.0378 0.0424 -0.2327 0.0447 
 [2.62]** [14.30]** [14.26]** [8.63]** [1.23] 
2002/03 0.2061 0.0207 0.0222 0.1894 0.1455 
 [0.68] [1.86] [1.62] [1.85] [1.16] 
Standard fundholder  0.5090 -0.0125 -0.0179 -0.0576 0.0749 
 [7.56]** [3.51]** [4.62]** [2.04]* [2.18]* 
Diff in diff 1998/99 -0.2521 0.0069 0.0092   
 [4.30]** [2.66]** [3.16]**   
Diff in diff 1999/00 -0.2585 0.0102 0.0120 0.0808 -0.1392 
 [4.00]** [3.22]** [3.39]** [2.34]* [2.76]** 
Diff in diff 2000/01 -0.2430 0.0167 0.0186 0.0553 0.0476 
 [3.61]** [4.77]** [4.74]** [1.45] [0.94] 
Diff in diff 2001/02 -0.2813 0.0113 0.0137 0.1324 -0.0828 
 [4.02]** [2.99]** [3.23]** [3.22]** [1.53] 
Diff in diff 2002/03 -0.2260 0.0174 0.0208 0.1004 -0.0090 
 [3.17]** [4.90]** [5.27]** [2.93]** [0.19] 
praclist 0.2416 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0580 -0.0456 
 [26.09]** [3.54]** [4.16]** [25.93]** [23.24]** 
listpergp 0.4361 0.0013 -0.0006 -0.1667 -0.1042 
 [9.68]** [0.55] [0.24] [12.25]** [8.46]** 
gpcontracept -0.2009 0.0022 0.0070 -0.0117 0.0146 
 [2.82]** [0.49] [1.43] [0.56] [0.72] 
gpsingle -0.7692 -0.0014 0.0010 0.4079 0.2763 
 [13.54]** [0.47] [0.31] [21.41]** [15.63]** 
mmr2prac -0.1112 0.0041 0.0040 0.0510 0.0576 
 [2.35]* [1.67] [1.47] [2.40]* [2.66]** 
gpdeput -0.2230 0.0221 0.0262 -0.0981 -0.1197 
 [2.90]** [4.27]** [4.65]** [4.73]** [6.15]** 
dispensingprac 0.3514 -0.036 -0.0426 0.1670 0.1474 
 [4.47]** [8.36]** [8.98]** [9.10]** [8.45]** 
distacute -0.0343 0.0051 0.0069 0.0012 -0.0016 
 [4.79]** [14.57]** [16.42]** [0.67] [0.90] 
distprivate 0.0485 -0.0029 -0.0044 0.0109 0.0062 
 [6.69]** [8.82]** [11.06]** [6.08]** [3.53]** 
acutebeds -4.3913 0.0708 0.1087 -0.1569 -0.3139 
 [16.88]** [4.84]** [6.67]** [2.25]* [4.23]** 
privatebeds 0.3304 -0.2231 -0.2909 -0.8190 -0.7945 
 [0.17] [1.92] [2.35]* [1.66] [1.53] 
residential 10.9272 -0.1621 -0.0364 -1.4252 3.0467 
 [2.71]** [0.69] [0.14] [1.36] [3.23]** 
cmf0-74 0.0106 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0015 0.0012 
 [3.98]** [2.56]* [2.52]* [2.31]* [1.93] 
lowbirthwght -0.0564 0.0096 0.0112 -0.0284 -0.0139 
 [2.13]* [6.10]** [6.51]** [4.43]** [2.31]* 
disability 0.0222 -0.0086 -0.0120 0.0105 -0.0534 
 [0.58] [3.82]** [4.85]** [1.03] [4.95]** 
incapacity -0.0024 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0014 
 [1.35] [3.22]** [3.64]** [3.91]** [2.73]** 
educdepriv -0.5593 0.0278 0.0330 -0.0674 -0.0352 
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 [8.22]** [7.09]** [7.63]** [3.87]** [2.18]* 
notuniv -0.0167 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0050 -0.0082 
 [2.30]* [1.07] [1.46] [2.86]** [5.13]** 
jobseekers -0.1890 0.0026 0.0041 -0.0126 -0.0289 
 [7.52]** [1.73] [2.50]* [1.97]* [4.61]** 
unemployment 5.9076 -0.7291 -0.8046 2.5471 0.5748 
 [3.10]** [6.36]** [6.45]** [5.26]** [1.21] 
Constant 8.3348 0.8801 0.6847 -6.0223 -11.2845 
 [1.45] [2.95]** [2.04]* [1.99]* [3.29]** 
Observations 44420 44472 44472 35325 35526 
Number of practices 7606 7607 7607 7508 7502 
z statistics in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions also include age and sex proportions of practice 
populations and higher level purchaser dummy variables  
 
 
Table 6: Practice commissioning patterns: difference between fundholders and non-
fundholders, all elective HRGs 
 NumProv99 MainShare Herfindahl lnAddShare lnDropShare 
Difference in 1997/8 0.5090 -0.0125 -0.0179   
 [7.56]** [-3.51]** [-4.62]**   
Difference in 1998/9 0.2569 -0.0056 -0.0087 -0.0576 0.0749 
 [4.06]** [-1.65] [-2.35]* [-2.04]* [2.18]* 
Difference in 1999/0 0.2505 -0.0023 -0.0059 0.0232 -0.0643 
 [4.04]** [-0.69] [-1.59] [0.92] [-1.95] 
Difference in 2000/1 0.2660 0.0042 0.0007 -0.0023 0.1224 
 [4.31]** [1.27] [0.19] [-0.10] [3.86]** 
Difference in 2001/2 0.2277 -0.0012 -0.0042 0.0748 -0.0079 
 [3.72]** [-0.33] [-1.09] [2.85]** [-0.23] 
Difference in 2002/3 0.2830 0.0049 0.0029 0.0428 0.0658 
 [4.41]** [1.49] [0.79] [2.05]* [2.14]* 
z statistics in brackets. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Fundholders minus non-fundholders. Derived from models in 
Table 5. 
 
 
The year coefficients show the changes in the commissioning measures which are not due to 
changes in budgetary arrangements.  We see that the underlying trend in number of providers was 
positive and that the number used increased over the period by 0.21 (compared to an average of 7.59 
in 1997/98).  By contrast the upward trends in the share at the main provider (2% over the period 
against a 1997/98 mean of 68.4% and the Herfindahl (0.02 over the period compared to an average 
of 0.54 in 1997/98) suggest increasing concentration over the period.  
 
Consider first the number of providers used.  The fundholder coefficient indicates that in 1997/98 
fundholders used more providers than non-fundholders and the DID coefficients indicate that the 
difference was reduced in 1998/99 and subsequent years (see also Table 6, column 1 and Figure 2). 
 
The ending of the fundholding regime had a significant effect on the proportion of fundholders’ 
patients sent to a practice’s main provider and their Herfindahl index.  During the fundholding regime 
fundholders had a significantly smaller share of admissions to their main provider.  Their Herfindahl 
was also smaller. After the abolition of fundholding these differences disappeared (see Table 6, 
columns 2 and 3, and Figure 2).  There was no significant difference between fundholder and non-
fundholder practices in the share of patients sent to their main provider and the practice Herfindahl 
index in the post fundholding period 1999/00 – 2002/03 (see Figure 2).  
 
We also investigate the influence of fundholding and the effect of the abolition of fundholding on the 
extent to which practices added patients at new providers or dropped patients from existing providers.  
Between the last two financial years of fundholding (1997/98 – 1998/99), fundholding practices 
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dropped a significantly higher proportion of patients from existing providers and added significantly 
fewer patients relative to non-fundholders (see Figure 2).  Following the abolition of fundholding, 
between the financial years 1998/99 and 1999/00, fundholder practices added significantly more 
patients to new providers and dropped significantly fewer patients from existing providers than non-
fundholder practices.  Over the remaining years in which primary care organisations were in place, we 
do not find any significant difference between fundholder and non-fundholder practices in terms of the 
proportion of patients dropped year to year from existing providers.  There is evidence, however, that 
a significantly higher proportion of fundholder admissions were admitted to new providers in the post-
fundholding years (see Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of commissioning patterns between fundholder and non-fundholder 
practices 
 
 
The regression results suggest that fundholders were more active purchasers than non-fundholders 
but that this effect dissipated in the years following the abolition of the system. 
 
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
vi
de
rs
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Financial year
Provider number
-.0
2
-.0
1
0
.0
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
at
 m
ai
n 
pr
ov
id
er
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Financial year
Main provider share
-.0
3
-.0
2
-.0
1
0
.0
1
H
er
in
da
hl
 in
de
x
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Financial year
Herfindahl index
-.1
-.0
5
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
P
ro
po
rti
on
 a
dd
ed
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Financial year
Share added
-.2
-.1
0
.1
.2
P
ro
po
rti
on
 d
ro
pp
ed
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Financial year
Share dropped
14    CHE Research paper 11 
The other variables in the regression model were included primarily to give greater precision to the 
estimate of the effect of fundholding but some are of interest in their own right.  Larger practices with 
more patients per GP use more providers, though, less intuitively, they have more concentrated 
admissions.  Dispensing practices were more likely to have patients admitted to more hospitals, their 
admissions were less concentrated with a smaller proportion of their patients admitted to a main 
provider and they had smaller Herfindahl indices.  Practices with a greater proportion of deputising 
GPs use fewer hospitals and have more concentrated admissions.  Single-handed GPs, GPs 
providing contraceptive clinics and those who undertake MMR2 vaccination used significantly fewer 
hospitals.  Practice characteristics associated with a higher proportion of admissions switched to new 
providers or dropped from existing providers include single-handed GPs, dispensing practices and 
MMR2 practices.  Larger practices were less likely to admit patients to new providers, but were more 
likely to drop patients from an existing provider.  Practices with more patients per GP and with a 
higher proportion of deputising GPs were significantly less likely to add new providers or to drop 
existing ones.  
 
Measures of access to secondary treatment had generally plausible effects on commissioning 
patterns.  Practices with a greater distance to their five nearest providers, and with a greater number 
of beds at their five nearest providers use fewer providers and have more concentrated admissions.  
GP practices with a greater distance to their five nearest private hospitals use more NHS providers 
and have less concentrated admissions.  The greater the number of private beds at the five closest 
private providers, the less concentrated are the practice’s admissions.  There is evidence that 
practices with more beds at their closest five providers were likely to have a smaller share of patients 
added or dropped from providers, but practices with greater distance to private providers were more 
likely to send patients to new providers or to drop existing providers.  
 
Some of the associations between the socio-economic characteristics of the practice population and 
commissioning variables are also plausible.  For example, the negative association of the number of 
providers used and the two measures of educational deprivation may suggest that the less educated 
groups are less vocal and less involved in making decisions about the location of treatment and GPs 
therefore are more conservative in their purchasing behaviour.  Other associations are less easy to 
rationalise.  Practices with higher comparative mortality factors, lower birthweights, and higher 
disability scores had higher Herfindahls which might suggest that practices with less healthy patients 
are less willing to shop around.  But practices with higher disability scores had lower Herfindahls.  The 
opposite effects of the unemployment rate and the proportion of the population with a jobseekers 
allowance may be due to jobseekers being counted as unemployed and picking up characteristics 
other then employment status.    
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Use of providers for elective care is highly concentrated and has become more concentrated over 
time.  In 1997/98 the average HA Herfindahl for elective admissions was 0.35 and in 2002/03 the 
average Herfindahl for PCTs was 0.55. Similarly the average share of admissions at the main 
provider for HAs in 1997/98 was 49.4% and in 2002/03 the average share at the main provider for 
PCTs was 69.4%.  These are major changes and arise from the reduced size of these higher level 
commissioning units as 100 HAs were converted into 302 PCTs, the reduced number of providers 
due to mergers, and to changes in budgetary arrangements after the abolition of fundholding in 
1999/00.   
 
There have been suggestions that PCTs are too small to be effective commissioners and that one 
way to give them more leverage over providers is to merge them into larger units.  This would reduce 
the concentration of admissions.  If the 302 PCTs in 2002/03 had been merged back into the 100 HAs 
in existence in 1997/98, the 2002/03 Herfindahl would have been reduced to 0.43.  Similarly the share 
at the main provider would have been reduced from 69.4% to 57.4%.  Thus even this drastic 
reorganisation would not reduce concentration to the high levels obtaining in 1997/98.  Only around 
half of the increase in actual concentration between 1997/98 and 2002/03 was due to the replacement 
of the 100 HAs operating in 1997/98 by the 302 PCTs in existence in 2002/03.  
 
Our analysis of practice level commissioning patterns suggests that fundholders were more active 
purchasers: they had smaller Herfindahls and had a smaller share of admissions at their main 
provider.  This suggests that the reintroduction of fundholding under the label of practice led 
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commissioning will lead to a small but non-trivial reduction in concentration for the practices which opt 
to hold a budget.  The overall effect will depend on the proportion of practices which opt to hold a 
budget. 
 
Our analysis is subject to some caveats.  Measures of concentration are of interest because the 
simple industrial organisation theory of private markets suggests that concentrated markets yield 
lower welfare than competitive markets.  The notion is plausible, though not uncontested even in 
private markets.  But its relevance to public health care sector markets with predominantly non-profit 
orientated providers, regulated prices, and zero prices for patients is less obvious.  The quality and 
effectiveness of the commissioning role cannot be assessed solely in terms of observed purchasing 
patterns.  Although we might expect purchasers that are actively seeking out better value services 
and more appropriate care for their patients to use a wider range of providers or to switch between 
providers, this is not necessarily the case. Instead, purchasers may have been successful using 
“contestable collaboration” to strike better deals with their existing local providers rather than shifting 
their business elsewhere [38].  There may be good reasons for developing long-term relationships 
with local providers, especially if purchasers are using their professional experience to assess the 
expertise of clinical services as they will always be more informed about those that are local to them.  
Relative stability may also reflect patient preferences if there is a general reluctance to travel to more 
distant providers and our results indeed suggest that practices further away from their 5 nearest acute 
providers use fewer providers than other practices and send a higher proportion of patients to their 
main provider.  Whilst we might expect to see some shifts in future as the supply-side of the market 
alters and purchasers take advantage of new entrants to the healthcare market (e.g. treatment 
centres), it is also possible that new primary-care based services will be developed to provide 
effective substitutes for some types of secondary care.  This suggests that the purchasing patterns we 
observe in secondary care may fail to capture the full impact of practice-led commissioning. 
 
Whether or not anything substantial will change in secondary care as a result of the latest round of 
policy shifts related to expansion of choice and practice-led commissioning, remains to be seen.  A 
recent review of the evidence of the impact of primary care-led commissioning concluded that there 
was little evidence to suggest it had made a significant impact on secondary care services [39]. 
However, evidence from the UK and elsewhere suggests that a whole range of factors will influence 
the success of alternative commissioning arrangements, including the degree to which there is control 
over the budgets, timely and accurate information, adequate management support and clinical 
ownership [39].    
 
Our analysis suggests that the major changes in the structure and organisation of the health service 
since 1997/98 have led to an increase in the already high level of commissioning for elective care.  
Our results will provide a baseline for evaluating the impact of new policies aimed specifically at 
changing the status quo.     
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